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Buddhism Co. Ltd?
Epistemology of religiosity,
and the re-invention of
a Buddhist monastery
in Hong Kong
Junxi Qian
The University of Hong Kong, China
Lily Kong
Singapore Management University, Singapore
Abstract
This article re-theorises the relationships between secularity and religiosity in modernity. While
geographers have recognised that the secular and the religious are mutually constituted, this
article pushes this theorisation further, arguing that the religious and the secular are in fact
hybrid constructs that embrace simultaneously the sacred and profane, the transcendent and
the immanent. Albeit the significant advancement in disrupting enclosed epistemologies of secular
modernity, relatively less work has sought to theorise the possibility of religion as a hybrid
operating at the secular–religious interface. Focusing on the ways in which a non-Western
religion, Buddhism, performs entangled relationships between religiosity and secularity, this
article argues that religious organisations and actors may refashion and re-invent themselves by
appropriating rationalities, values and logics normatively defined as ‘secular’. It presents a study of
Po-Lin Monastery, a Buddhist monastery in Hong Kong that has adopted highly entrepreneurial,
growth-oriented approaches in organisation and production of space.
Keywords
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Introduction
What transformations occur to religion, in both institutional and spatial terms, in the
context of secular modernity? Theories of secularisation, to begin with, have underscored
the decline of faith on an individual basis, the relegation of religion to the private sphere, and
the diﬀerentiation of religion from other social systems, such as market, science, state, etc.
(Casanova, 1994). While the ﬁrst dimension has been widely questioned due to inconsistent
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statistics and survey results, the latter two have more far-reaching theoretical implications,
reifying a secular–religious dichotomy in the epistemologies of modernity. Over the past
decades, geographical scholarships have made substantial advancements in questioning these
theoretical premises, and in so doing problematising the normative distinction between the
secular and the religious. On the one hand, studies have recognised that religion is still very
much on the agendas of public politics (Kong and Woods, 2016). On the other hand, a
proliferating literature attends to the interpenetration between religious practices and the
presumably profane domain of mundane lives (Bartolini et al., 2017; Holloway, 2003).
As geographers have come to realise, the religious and the secular are in fact mutually
constituted (Ricoeur, 1995; Tse, 2014). However, while it is now widely accepted that the
constitution of sacredness is embedded in social contexts (Kong, 2001), the very construct of
‘religion’ is not very often problematised. In some studies, religion remains a ‘black box’ that
lacks deﬁnition (Tse, 2014); in others, the notion of religion as something diametrically
opposed to the secular in terms of ideologies and values is still employed as a default
point of entry into inquiries on sacred, spiritual and religious spatialities. In contrast, the
possibility of religions as hybrids, operating at the secular–religious interface, is pursued only
to a limited extent. This observation, though, is not borne out of oblivion to the vibrant
literature on faith-based organisations (FBOs), which notes that religious ethos and
doctrines are ﬂexible and malleable vis-a`-vis secular concerns, changing from the focus on
transcendence to this-worldly care and public engagement (Beaumont and Cloke, 2012).
This article follows this theoretical direction but aims to further this line of theorisation.
It argues that in modernity, religious organisations and actors may refashion and re-invent
themselves by actively engaging with and appropriating rationalities, values and logics that
are normatively deﬁned as ‘secular’. To put it more boldly, this article asks whether religion
itself can be ‘secularised’, to the extent that it selectively ‘learns’ (in the spirit of Habermas’
(2006) rendering of this word) from secular orientations to recompose religious values, ethics
and worldviews. This is not to argue for the dilution of religiosity. Rather, we contend that
religion is susceptible to what Taylor (2007) has theorised as the immanent frame – religious
actors reinforce the position of faith in the cultural landscapes of modernity by carefully
managing and navigating the secular–religious interface.
In modernity, the belief that religion is sequestrated from other spheres of social thought
and action disciplines how people understand and inhabit systems of faith. Nonetheless, as
Asad (2003) and Tse (2014) argue, secular–religious boundaries are socially constructed and
contingently performed, built on volatile and unstable signiﬁers and discourses. Straddling
these boundaries, therefore, involves ongoing deﬁnition of what are accepted as legitimate
and appropriate practices for religious actors (Asad, 1993).
The need to pursue this theorisation is made urgent by myriad novel, innovative religious
practices that geographers of religion have overall been slow to address: New Age
spiritualities, megachurches, the Charismatic and Pentecostal movements, the religious
reforms in East Asia to ‘modernise’ traditional beliefs, among others (Bartolini et al.,
2017; Covell, 2005; Maddox, 2012; Madsen, 2007). These movements emerged amidst
social changes associated with high or late modernity and are characterised by theological
orientations, tactics of publicity and marketing and organisational cultures that bear clear
traces of the secular logics of market, economy and individualism.
To give credence to our arguments, this article presents a case study of Po-Lin Monastery,
a Buddhist monastery in Hong Kong that has, over the course of the past few decades,
adopted highly entrepreneurial, growth-oriented approaches in both organisation and the
production of space. In 1993, after several years of fundraising and lobbying the
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Chinese central government for support, the monastery completed the Tian Tan Buddha, a
34-metre-tall bronze statue of the sitting Buddha. The statue made the monastery the
principal centre of Buddhism in Hong Kong and a popular destination of cultural
tourism. It was also a milestone event in the transition of the monastery, from the focus
on otherworldly transcendence, to active ‘religious marketing’ and an entrepreneurial,
expansionist mentality (Einstein, 2008). This article pays speciﬁc attention to a 2002
polemic between the monastery and the Hong Kong government over the state’s proposal
of a cable car project and an aﬃliated tourism complex in Ngong Ping, Lantau Island, the
rural settlement where the monastery is located. The initiative aimed to capitalise on the
‘authentic’ cultures of Lantau, Buddhist culture included, to boost the weakened tourism
sector in Hong Kong. The cable car project (Ngong Ping 360, NP 360 hereafter) – went into
service in 2006, along with the tourism complex (Ngong Ping Village), but with notable
concessions made to the monastery.
The empirical research draws from three sets of data: (1) all Hong Kong-published
newspaper articles (published between May 2002, when the controversy erupted, and
October 2016) themed on Po-Lin Monastery, totalling 339 in Chinese and 84 in
English; (2) government documents, including four versions of Ngong Ping Outline
Zoning Plan (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) referring to the construction of NP 360, a
feasibility study and a Legislative Council Panel Review of the same project, and
Ngong Ping Development Plan (completed by Hong Kong Planning Department in
2003; (3) 10 in-depth interviews with various stakeholders involved in tourism
development of Ngong Ping, including two senior monks in Po-Lin Monastery, lay
staﬀ in the monastery, one member of the Islands District Council overseeing Ngong
Ping, ﬁve local villagers and staﬀ at Ngong Ping 360 Limited (a subsidiary of Hong
Kong’s MTR Corporation, and the developer and manager of NP 360).
Above all, the empirical study suggests that, while the monastery mobilised media
discourses and represented the controversy as a secular–religious conﬂict, accusing the
government of encroaching the tranquillity and sacredness of a religious establishment,
beneath this rhetoric was the worry that the new development would involve resuming a
plot of land currently controlled by the monastery and distracting tourists’ spending, which
would eventually curtail monastic income and jeopardise the monastery’s own project of
further construction and expansion. In this sense, instead of framing this controversy in a
secular vs. religious hermeneutic, we analyse it as the collision between two competing, yet
similarly entrepreneurial logics – the developmentalist logic of the state and the monastery’s
own vision of expanding and consolidating a ‘spiritual marketplace’ (Roof, 1999). However,
if the dichotomies of religious–secular, sacred–profane collapse from within, it by no means
signals the ‘decline’ of religion, as proponents of the secularisation theory might be tempted
to argue. Rather, the monks legitimise their agendas on a religious ground – namely, to
secure a foothold of Buddhism in a highly modernised and secularised Asian global city, and
in a time when religious beliefs are freed of cultural/communal obligations. In the 2002
controversy, while the state project was modelled on cultural economic rationalities, based
on an abstracted notion of culture as ﬁxed resource to tap into (Raco and Gilliam, 2012), the
equally proactive approach of the monastery extended beyond utilitarianism and retained an
emphasis on religious meanings and identities.
Ultimately, this article hopes to contribute to the intellectual enterprise advocated by
commentators such as Casanova (2006), to rethink the porous, ﬂuid line between the
religious and the secular from a global comparative perspective. While modernity and the
subsequent diﬀerentiation of religion from other spheres are more or less global phenomena,
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there is still the need to rethink the religious–secular divide beyond the Eurocentric roots of
the secularisation paradigms. As Casanova (2008) argues,
one should ask whether it is appropriate to subsume the multiple and very diverse historical
patterns of diﬀerentiation and fusion of the various institutional spheres (that is, church and
state, state and economy, economy and science) that one ﬁnds throughout the history of modern
Western societies into a single, teleological process of modern functional diﬀerentiation. (103)
This article ventures to examine how the fuzziness of secular–religious boundaries
manifests itself in a religious tradition historically involved in the modern transition in
very diﬀerent ways from European Christianity, but meanwhile embroiled in global
economic transformation, expressed locally in the entrepreneurial urban governance of
Hong Kong.
Modernity, secular-religious interplay and the possibilities for
‘entrepreneurial religion’
As Taylor (2007) assertively claims, modern people live in a secular age, in which secular
orders are independent of transcendence and spirituality. The view that in modernity,
religious and secular actors base actions on very diﬀerent constellations of values, norms
and thoughts mirrors the ideas of early theorists, chief amongst whom was Berger (1967),
and is resonant with a more general position about the functional diﬀerentiation in modern
society (Dobbelaere, 2002). Bruce (2010), in a more comprehensive account, traces the
sequestration of religion into a self-enclosed domain, due to rationalisation, specialisation,
social diﬀerentiation, individualisation, the decline of small cultural communities, social and
cultural diversity, privatisation of faith, secular state, the rise of scientiﬁc and economic
consciousness, among many other factors.
However, if modernity is a historical project that aims at institutionalising various
cultural, social and political principles, while not necessarily reﬂecting lived realities of
society, it is intellectually rewarding to expose the artiﬁciality and inconsistencies inherent
in binary epistemologies underpinning the separation of the religious and the secular (Asad,
2003). Indeed, a recurring theme in the geographical scholarship on religion concerns the
ways in which the boundaries between sacred and profane, religious and secular are
ﬂuidised, transgressed and problematised. Engaging with the conceptual umbrella of
postsecularity, articulated by several theorists as one of the self-reﬂexive projects
of modernity (Gorski and Altınordu, 2008; Habermas, 2006, 2008), one thread of
scholarship has questioned the hypothesis of privatisation and given testimony to the
revival, or indeed persistence, of religion in the public sphere. In particular, faith actors
bring religiously motivated ethics and values to bear on the engagements in social welfare,
care and activism (Beaumont, 2008; Beaumont and Cloke, 2012). The notion of the
postsecular has also been applied to the analysis of how religion constitutes everyday
subjectivities, organising and enriching the meanings of lived, embodied experiences
(Go¨karıksel and Secor, 2017; Olson et al., 2013).
A second thread of scholarship has given substance to the argument that the religious is
not so much re-entering the secular but has always disrupted the monolithic representations
of the latter, because secular modernity is always-already enchanted by religious impulses
and expressions (Bartolini et al., 2017). Echoing this view, discussions of occulture,
alternative spiritualities, everyday spiritualities and house churches adeptly reveal the
‘excess’ of religion into the ‘routine’, profane spaces and times (Bartolini et al., 2017;
Holloway, 2003; Kong, 2002; MacKian, 2012; Mills, 2012; Woods, 2013).
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However, while the narratives of the cross-over between the secular and the religious are
widely accepted by geographers of religion, much more eﬀort has been dedicated to
problematising and criticising secularity than rethinking and theorising what religion and
religiosity actually mean in modernity. This study hence attempts to subvert the religious–
secular binary in a reverse direction and argues that while disrupting secular modernity,
religiosity itself is re-constituted. Again, this rethinking starts from the recognition that the
secular–religious dichotomy is integral to modernity as a hegemonic project, but not played
out in seamless ways to religion as praxis. In fact, Asad (2003) suggests that to ‘make a rigid
division between the sacred and the secular is surely to impoverish both’ (9). Asad goes on to
argue that, when either religious or secular actors navigate social milieus, there is no single
and consistent motive for a complex action; instead, ‘there were several part-agents’,
‘because of the diverse desires, sensibilities, and self-images involved’ (12) – hence,
religious actors can only be analysed by looking at ‘overlapping, fragmented cultures,
hybrid selves, continuously dissolving and emerging social states’ (15). Ultimately, it is
doubtable whether immanence and transcendence are really so mutually exclusive as
Taylor (2007) has claimed. Even in Europe, the bastion of the secularisation thesis,
theorists such as Habermas (2006) have reminded that faith actors are exposed to the
cognitive dissonances between secular and religious worldviews, and hence face the need
to ‘develop an epistemic stance toward the independence of secular from sacred knowledge’
(14). What results is a process of learning that involves the reconstruction of orientations,
behaviours and the universe of knowledge for faith actors, leading to ‘a more reﬂexive form
of religious consciousness’ (Habermas, 2008: 28). Hence, the central problematique
concerning religion in modernity is not so much the extent to which religion has declined
or persisted, but ‘how religious thought and practice changed in relation to modernization’
(Wilford, 2010: 333), manifested by myriad innovation, adaptation, and reinterpretation in
religious organisation and expression (Lambert, 1999).
This argument is developed most eloquently by the French religious theorist Danie`le
Hervieu-Le´ger (1986, 2002), who has attended closely to the ‘ongoing reorganization of
the nature and forms of religion into conﬁgurations which are compatible with modern
living’ (Davie, 2007: 61). Instead of ascertaining the extent that religion jibes with, or
deviates from, the normativised religious–secular diﬀerentiation, a more reﬁned approach
delves into ‘the kinds of religiosity that are nurtured by and ﬂourish in modern societies’
(Davie, 1996: 101), shaped by intertwined processes of secularisation and sacralisation.
In other words, new forms of religious organisation and expression are more productively
analysed as products of, rather than backlash against, modernity. Eventually, it appears that
a religious institution that ‘thinks and speaks from the inside of modernity’ is more likely to
negotiate eﬀectively upheavals of modern society and meet the changing demands of its
constituency (Davie, 1996: 106).
In particular, to unravel the mutual constitution of religion and modern market culture is
a crucial step in theorising the case study in this article. Here, we single out market economy,
and the cultures and values associated with it, as a key this-worldly condition constitutive of
religiosity (Lambert, 1999). We do not argue that religiosity is rendered inauthentic to the
extent that it is colonised by instrumental logics and rational calculation, but that religious
representations are embroiled in dynamic equilibriums between parallel horizons and
competing forces.
These multifaceted relationships can be summarised from three perspectives.
First, religion may act as a response or even cure to conditions of capitalist modernity,
for example, in the context of neoliberal overhauling of social welfare regimes and the re-
enlivened engagements of FBOs (Beaumont, 2008). Note that this process is not about
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transplanting existing theo-ethics to secular agendas, but involving reforms of theologies,
namely, the transition from faith-by-dogma to faith-by-praxis (Cloke and Beaumont, 2012;
Williams, 2015). Second, religion may even provide theological justiﬁcations for economic
rationalities and behaviours. This view bears the trace of Weber’s treatise on protestant ethic
but ﬁnds new resonances in an era of neoliberalism, given the active role played by faith
organisations in cultivating development aspirations and individualistic conceptions of merit
or failure (Hackworth, 2010; Olson, 2006). The ﬁnal thread of studies, mostly in the
sociology of religion, attends to the ways in which religion itself adopts modalities of
operation informed by proactive, entrepreneurial and market-oriented outlooks, giving
rise to ‘entrepreneurial religion’, a phrase used by Lanz and Oosterbaan (2016) to
illustrate paradigmatic changes in religious organisation. To conceptualise religion in this
way underlines ‘aspirations-visions of a this-worldly millennium’ (Comaroﬀ, 2009: 24), but,
contrary to Comaroﬀ’s more pessimistic accounts, does not need to presuppose seamless
co-option of religion by the secular economy.
All three dimensions are attuned with the tenet of our argument; that is, religiosity as
praxis is negotiated and ongoing. But it is the third line of inquiry that we want to pursue in
depth, to cast light on the new organisational culture of Po-Lin Monastery. One body of
literature that narrates comparable storylines is that on the Christian megachurches.
Although deﬁned based on the size of regular attendance, what interests social scientists
the most is the fact that megachurches are completely compatible with ethos of market and
consumerism. Non-denominational or loosely denominational, megachurches have gained
impetus in a context where liquid modernity renders all boundaries blurred (Gauthier, 2014).
As Maddox (2012) observes, the activities and messages of megachurches are probably less
aligned with traditional teachings than the culture of global capitalism.
Megachurches have proved extraordinarily adept in reconciling the dissonances between
secular and religious logics. In addition to their theological orientations, usually described as
prosperity gospels (Chong, 2015), the ways that megachurches manufacture and market
religious experiences are of particular relevance to the current study. First, megachurches
mobilise multiple techniques of branding and marketing (Einstein, 2008). This not only
involves media exposure, public relation consultancy and reliance on the publishing
industry but also the remaking of religion as mediated – ‘a set of practices, objects and
ideas’ (Engelke, 2010: 374), with a strong material presence via spectacular buildings, stylish
interior designs, capacious spaces, visual aesthetics, etc. This is epitomised foremost by rock-
concert-style worship sessions that rely heavily on the technologies of pop culture, semiotics
and performativity (Chong, 2015; Connell, 2005; Cruz, 2009; Goh, 2008; Yip and
Ainsworth, 2015).
Second, megachurches generally adopt a reformed, modernised and growth-oriented
organisation of operation, management and ﬁnance, led by charismatic personalities with
strategic visions. A forward-looking outlook is exempliﬁed by an emphasis on the constant
‘development’ of the church and growth of congregation (Goh, 2008; Maddox, 2012; Poon
et al., 2012; Yip and Ainsworth, 2015). Finally, theologies of megachurches are largely
devoid of concerns with social injustice and humanitarian purposes, but focus
predominantly on personal experiences, spirituality and inner self (Chong, 2015; Cruz, 2009).
The literature on megachurches is broadly situated in religious economics (RE) and
rational choice theory (RCT) in the sociology of religion. To frame our empirical case in
this very large literature, we underline one argument in RE and RCT; that is, the enterprising
behaviours of religious institutions and actors enliven a vibrant market of religious
consumption (Finke and Stark, 2000; Iannaccone, 1998). ‘Entrepreneurial religion’ is able
to make headway because of the dismantling of traditional bonds between community and
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belief, paralleled by the individualisation and subjectivisation of religion (Bruce, 1996).
This process allows religion to enter ‘the world of options, lifestyles and preferences’
(Davie, 2007: 56), a state of ‘believing without belonging’ (Davie, 1994), whereby
individuals make choices about their religions compatible with their calculations of costs
and beneﬁts.
Despite that this body of work is often viewed as a theoretical mineﬁeld that deﬁes easy
empirical validation, we can derive explanatory value from these epistemologies,
epistemologies that locate religion squarely within, not outside, secular modernity.
First, in the lexicon of RE and RCT, religious experiences are akin to goods to be
consumed, religious believers, now re-theorised as religious consumers, are rational actors
who ‘shop’ for goods that maximise religious satisfaction. It is the changing demands of
consumers that activate the institutional restructuring of religions (Iannaccone, 1992, 1998).
Second, RE and RCT underscore that ‘religious developments derive from change in the
incentives and opportunities facing religious producers’ (Finke and Iannaccone, 1993: 28).
Hence, these theories emphasise the tactics of marketing and competition adopted by
religious entrepreneurs to fashion new religiosities and experiences (Roof, 1999).
Taking stock of the theoretical perspectives discussed so far, we believe that these
theoretical contours enable us to frame religion within the spaces and social struggles of a
cosmopolitan city such as Hong Kong, amidst globalisation, capitalism and state
developmentalism (Hancock and Srinivas, 2008; Lanz and Oosterbaan, 2016). Following
the advent of Western modernity, Hong Kong has been susceptible to an immanent frame,
but, akin to the US experience, has retained a vibrant edge of religiosity. However, the
secular–religious divide has charted a very diﬀerent course in Hong Kong both from the
secularised Western Europe and the ‘gloriously American’ religious marketplace (Sharot,
2002). On the one hand, religion has kept an abiding presence in Hong Kong’s public sphere,
organising communal socialities and motivating political struggles (Kwok, 2015; Liu, 2003).
Besides, traditional and folk religions in Chinese societies (China, Taiwan and Hong Kong),
Buddhism included, appear to be adept in adopting the pragmatic, growth-oriented and
entrepreneurial spirits of modernity, seeing no problem in the use of money as a medium,
even measurement, of transcendent commitment (Chan and Long, 2011; Weller, 2001). On
the other hand, however, there is no need to take approaches such as RE and RCT
dogmatically, for, as Sharot (2002) reminds us, they are very much derived from the US
context. When analysing the Hong Kong case, two caveats are warranted. First, in religion,
value cannot always be standardised and rationally calculated. Speciﬁc returns to religious
institutions – such as memberships, cultural popularity and religious commitment – cannot
be measured in the same way as proﬁts but may be integral to the proactive outlook of faith
actors (Palmer, 2011). Second, RE and RCT emphasise instrumental rationality, but are
reticent in value-rational orientations focusing on transcendent values (Jerolmack and
Porpora, 2004). Neither can we jettison the alternative of conceptualising religion as
irrational ‘social contagion’ (Mellor, 2000), concerning issues of identity, meaning,
community, and so on. Thus, while the epistemological location of religion within
modernity in RE and RCT resonates with the study, our examination of Po-Lin
Monastery does not take at face value the idea of a spiritual marketplace. The question is
really how religion re-invents itself to adapt to the immanent frame, within the ambits of
which we orient and live our lives, both secular and religious.
Before proceeding to the case study, we insert a caveat regarding our treatment of
Buddhism as religion. By characterising the negotiations between the Po-Lin Monastery
and the state as evidence of intersections between the religious and the secular, this article
is, in one sense, complicit in ontologising Buddhism as a ‘religion’, even though we recognise
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that the secular–religious divide was historically unknown to Chinese folk belief systems, of
which Buddhism has oftentimes been syncretically embroiled. Informed by the works of
Go¨karıksel and Secor (2010, 2017), we acknowledge that we should not lose sight of the
ways that the everyday undermines enclosed deﬁnitions of religion and religiosity. Still, we
believe that the conceptualisation of Buddhism as a relatively separate domain of spiritual and
other-worldly pursuits is valid in the context of this study. Indeed, ever since the late 19th
century, Chinese folk beliefs have been consistently exposed to the Western constructions
of religiosity and secularity. In the early 20th century, Chinese political elites and
intellectuals borrowed, via Meiji Japan, the Western vocabulary of religion (Chinese:
zongjiao ), which was then conceptualised scientiﬁcally as a coherent system of
theosophy, scriptures, clergy and religious sites (Ashiwa and Wank, 2009; Yang, 2008). As
Asad (2003) argues, the invention of ‘religion’ is always-already a secularisingmove, because it
simultaneously reiﬁes the secular domain. Meanwhile, religion is an in situ performance,
whose ontological signiﬁcance is brought to life by state and market forces. The Hong
Kong state recognises explicitly religion as a subsystem of society and ‘religion’ (oﬃcially
comprised of Buddhism, Catholicism, Protestantism, Taoism and Islam) is even designated as
a functional constituency participating in electoral activities. Also, the need to market
Buddhism as appealing to a modern and urban society encourages the clergy to see
Buddhism as a cosmos of unique spiritual values and experiences.
In sum, we do not suggest that Po-Lin Monastery follows Christian denominations selling
prosperity gospel. After all, Chinese Buddhism, through the notion of karma, was
traditionally appropriated by ordinary people for pursuit of this-worldly beneﬁts and
prosperity. We are reluctant to liken this articulation of religiosity to prosperity gospel,
which emerged amidst late and ﬂuid modernities. Our point is that, despite the persisting
ontological diﬀerences between Buddhism and Western religiosity, the empirical materials in
this article can nevertheless be usefully expounded by theories of entrepreneurial religion and
religious economics.
Enterprising Buddhism: Ethos of religious organisation,
operation and marketing
Religion, only when it changes with the epoch or even pushes forward the epoch, can act as a
guide for the living beings. (A Century of Po-Lin Monastery, 2014: 101)
This section sketches a broad picture of the changing ways that Po-Lin Monastery has
engaged with a secularised, modernised world. It not only supplies a context for the
subsequent discussion of the 2002 controversy but is also in its own right illustrative of
the crossing-over between the religious and the secular. Po-Lin Monastery was established
in 1911 by three immigrant monks from Mainland China, beginning with no more than a
shabby hut. For a good part of the monastery’s history, Buddhism was overshadowed by
Christianity, which was almost the default religious belief for elite echelons of this colonial
society. The general disadvantage faced by Buddhism, and the mass conversion of educated
Chinese to Christianity were the broad contexts in which a this-worldly outlook and nascent
consciousness of religious competition began to emerge for monks (Interview, Monk W,
September 2016). Po-Lin Monastery was also under the inﬂuence of a much wider movement
of Buddhist modernisation in Republican China (This-Worldly Buddhism Movement,
Renjian Fojiao). Renjian Fojiao, heralded by several reform-minded monks, advocated that
religion must cater to spiritual and cultural demands of people negotiating rapid social
changes (Madsen, 2007). As early as the 1930s, and under the leadership of its second
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abbot, Master Fat Ho, Po-Lin began to engage in activities that had a vaguely enterprising
facet, including the promotion of Buddhist music and magazines, and running of schools.
In 1966, the monastery made a reform of its organisation, entrusting the management to an
elected board of directors.
In the 1970s, as Buddhism was gradually reclaiming its share of the religious market, the
idea of building a gigantic statue of Buddha was mooted. The staunchest support,
interestingly, came from the Chinese central state, which at that time was eager to renew
social and cultural ties with colonial Hong Kong and thus lent considerable ﬁnancial and
technical aid. The principal rationale for constructing the statue was to give Buddhist
religiosity a strong material presence, and made pilgrimage a spectacular, even sublime
experience. As a book compiled by the monastery suggests, the materiality of the statue is
integral to the civilising function of Buddhism in the contemporary world (A Century of
Po-Lin Monastery, 2014: 28).
Since Fat Ho, most abbots of Po-Lin Monastery have been charismatic leaders seeing
Buddhism as closely entangled with textures of secular modernity. This progressive, forward-
looking mentality is embraced whole-heartedly by Master Sik Chi Wai, who has been the de
facto leader of the monastery since the 1990s and succeeded as abbot in 2005. In addition to
being a principal protagonist of Tian Tan Buddha, Chi Wai is no less a media celebrity than
‘holy mavericks’ in the US (Lee and Sinitiere, 2009). Chi Wai presents himself as a strong
voice in the public sphere. On the one hand, he does not retreat from secular politics, having
served as a councillor in the Island District Council and two terms as a representative of
Hong Kong to China’s National People’s Congress. On the other hand, he advocates vocally
the expansionist vision of Po-Lin Monastery in the media, arguing that, for a religion to
survive in modern society, the horizon of religious experiences must be perpetually
broadened (e.g. Ming Pao, 6 May 2006).
We spotlight four aspects of the monastery’s strategic and tactical manoeuvres that
supersede the barriers between transcendence and immanence. First, the monastery
carefully manipulates state–religion relations. In contrast to Christian groups in Hong
Kong, aligned in general with an anti-establishment, pro-democracy position, Po-Lin
Monastery and Buddhism in Hong Kong as a whole are in alliance with Beijing and the
incumbent state regime. The Tian Tan Buddha, indeed, is used by the monastery to
symbolise its close connection with the ‘motherland’ and the Chinese central state. The
monastery also vocally supports the Hong Kong government. Illustrative of this political
leaning is a 2013 scenario, in which Chi Wai urged activists preparing for the Occupy Central
Movement to relinquish their plan (Oriental Daily, 12 May 2013). However, it may be
misguided to conclude that Buddhist actors are simply co-opted by the state. Rather,
their political stance has a strategic edge, giving them extra stake while negotiating with
the state for scarce resources such as land and ﬁnance. A newspaper editorial postulated
explicitly that the Hong Kong government made concessions during the 2002 polemic
precisely because, encountering tension with Christian groups, they could not aﬀord
losing yet another ally in civil society (Sing Tao Daily, 28 October 2002).
Second, the monastery has reformed its organisation so that it acts like a business, with
expertise in non-religious activities, rather than a community of monks whose horizon of
actions is restricted to the religious realm. With a board of directors as the supervising body,
the monastery has been registered as a limited company since 1966, albeit retaining a charity
status. The advantages of structuring the monastery as a modern enterprise have been
manifest in recent years, while it has substantially diversiﬁed its activities, encompassing
both non-proﬁt (religious rituals, celebrations, charity) and proﬁt-driven (commercial
religious services, production and retailing of tourist souvenirs, property investment) ones.
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Overall, new organisational approaches enable clear division of responsibilities among
directors sitting on the board, cleared legal barriers for hiring laypersons as employees
and rationalised the management of personnel and ﬁnance. It has also occasioned
unprecedented translocal mobility of monks. With the outlook of an enterprise, the
monastery taps into a vast pool of qualiﬁed monks, beyond those keeping permanent
residence in the monastery. A sizable number of Mainland Chinese monks have therefore
migrated to work for Po-Lin Monastery, easing to some extent the shortage of local
Buddhist monks. As Buddhism in the Mainland already has a noticeable this-worldly
orientation and is to a notable extent commercialised (Sun, 2011), mobility of monks has
further fed into the entrepreneurial culture in the monastery.
Third, Po-Lin Monastery’s management of ﬁnance is now underpinned by an
instrumental rationality, where the pursuit of proﬁt is accepted by monastery leaders as a
central mission. In fact, the monastery was likened by a media editorial to a business empire,
with a net worth of 1.2 billion HKD (Note: Hong Kong Dollar (HKD) is approximately
equivalent to US$0.13) in 2015 (East Week, 21 October 2015). On the one hand, the
perpetual development, expansion and construction of the monastery call for ﬁnancial
resources. In response, the monastery provides a wide range of religiously coded,
standard-priced services and experiences, including vegetarian meals, amulets, souvenirs,
rituals, etc. To attach price tags to religiosity has aroused some confusion and anxiety
among the monks, and tensions between the sacred and profane logics are apparently at
play in their religious subjectivities – ‘traditionally, believers donate to us at their will, and to
charge unitary prices seems too utilitarian’ (Interview, Monk F, October 2010). In addition,
Po-Lin Monastery actively engages in real estate investment, and in 2015 alone, the
monastery reaped about 27 million HKD from property speculation. On the other hand,
at least in the case of Buddhism in Hong Kong, no longer does the clergy or the laity see
asceticism and material simplicity as indispensable conditions of monks’ spiritual fulﬁlment.
In other words, a certain extent of ‘indulgence’ in the material aﬄuence and consumer
culture of the modern world is viewed as acceptable even for monks. Ironically, as a
religious institution meant to provide moral guidance, Po-Lin Monastery has been caught
in a series of scandals associated with ﬁnance. The most tumultuous one surfaced in 2015
and was centred on Sik Chi Ding, a disciple of Po-Lin Monastery and the head nun of Ting
Wai Monastery. In addition to allegations of having successively married two monks in Po-
Lin Monastery, Chi-Ding was found to be an avid purchaser of luxurious jewelleries,
furniture and cosmetics, and lead a Benz-cum-iPhone lifestyle by misappropriating
donations from believers.
Finally, and of particular relevance to this study, the monastery prioritises continual
expansion and development, inter alia the building of spectacular material structures.
After the Tian Tan Buddha project, on the top of the monastery’s agenda was the
construction of a grandiose structure named ‘Ten Thousand Buddha Hall’, which was to
be home to 10,000 gold-gilded statues of Buddha and precious Buddhist relics and arts. The
hall, whose construction cost 400 million HKD and took seven years, opened in 2014. Now,
the monastery is already in the middle of planning a bell tower, a drum tower and a Buddhist
college. The hall project will be the subject of later discussion. Suﬃce it to point out here that
the monks read these agendas as tokens of commitment to Buddhism. In the monks’
narratives, and to employ Kong and Woods’ (2016) framework for making sense of these
narratives, competition for a share in a religious market involves both intra-/inter-religious
competition (between ﬁve oﬃcially recognised religions in Hong Kong, and between myriad
independent religious organisations) and religious–secular competition (with other
attractions in the Islands District, e.g. the Hong Kong Disneyland). These building
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agendas are also resonant with the view that in modernity religion is more or less a personal
choice that can be cultivated and directed (Hervieu-Le´ger, 2001) – as Monk F remarked, ‘we
build and we spend money, because we don’t want people to lose interest in us and forget us;
so, our topmost mission is still to promote Buddhist teachings’ (October 2016).
The unfolding of the 2002 controversy
In 2002, the Hong Kong government announced the project of building a cable car system
linking Tung Chung, a northern portal township in Lantau Island and Ngong Ping.
The cable car was to be coupled with a tourism complex, consisting of hotels, hostels,
shops and eateries. The rationale underlining the project was to capitalise on the Buddhist
heritage, natural landscapes and authentic rurality of Lantau, to inject growth impetus to
Hong Kong’s tourism sector after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. MTR Group, the
operator of the city’s railway system and an active participant in property development,
was selected as the developer of the project. However, even though Po-Lin Monastery and
Buddhism were listed as integral elements of what the state conceived as tourist attraction of
the island, the project did not attend directly to religiosity. Instead, Buddhism was
approached as an exploitable economic base, a backdrop to a wide array of tourist and
leisure experiences, rather than a concrete system of values, meanings and identities that
might come into conﬂict with secular developmentalism. During the interview, staﬀ at
Ngong Ping 360 Limited also stated explicitly, ‘We are not a religiously related cable car
project, in our positioning. . . and we never really played the religious role that high’
(September 2016). Now that the plan has come to fruition, the tourism complex is home
to a gamut of food and beverage outlets, tourist-related product shops, and folk cultural
displays, the vast majority of which do not have a discernible religious underpinning. In this
sense, the Hong Kong government appeared to be replicating the problem of the
controversial West Kowloon Cultural District, formulating cultural policies in purely
technical and functionalist terms, but downplaying culture as actually inhabited and
contested by diﬀerent constituencies of people (Kong et al., 2015).
Soon after the state revealed the project, Po-Lin Monastery adopted a radical stance,
criticising NP360 as a disruptive, even blasphemous project that Buddhists should respond
to with an ‘uprising’ (e.g. Ming Pao, 23 October 2002). Over the course of their campaign,
the monks proved adept in mobilising the public sphere, especially media. If, as Stolow
(2005) argues, the myth of modern media as an instrument of secularisation is
increasingly subject to doubt, the campaign launched by Po-Lin monastery oﬀered a vivid
account attesting to this argument. Nonetheless, navigating through the media discourses
promulgated by the monastery, and cross-referencing them with acts and practices taking
place on the ground, the need to tease out the incoherencies and discrepancies becomes
apparent.
On the part of the monastery, the monks, rallied around Master Chi Wai, carefully
framed the conﬂict as one between the religious and the secular. The monastery claimed
three rationales for opposing NP360. First, while the monastery in principle accepted the
necessity of the cable car system for improving tourist accessibility, it opposed the building
of hotels and eateries, for they would disrupt the tranquillity and sacredness in the environs
of the monastery. It claimed that tourists residing in Ngong Ping would create too much
hustle-bustle, and Western tourists insensitive to Eastern religions might be indiscreet in
behaviours and attires. Meanwhile, the monastery expressed worry that newly built eateries
would turn a blind eye to religious taboos and sell meat dishes, contradicting the
vegetarianism of Buddhists. For Master Chi Wai, it was particularly profane if ‘tourists
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walked in the vicinity of the monastery with chicken legs and hamburgers in their hands’
(Ming Pao, 4 July 2002). Amidst the vocal contestation by the monastery, the Hong Kong
Planning Department revised the development plan in June 2002 so that no hotel would be
included.
Second, the monastery criticised top-down developmentalism for disempowering and
potentially displacing vernacular economic practices of the native villagers catering to
tourists. This rhetoric concerned the six local rural households that were, at the time of
the controversy, the sole suppliers of food to pilgrims and visitors. While the emphasis on
economic livelihoods did not fall squarely into the religious–secular divide, the monastery
did suggest that practices of local people were more sensitive to Buddhist religiosity. The
primary testament, the monastery claimed, was that local villagers refrained from selling
meat dishes, out of respect to Buddhist doctrines. In sum, the monastery purported the
impression that they had formed a grassroots alliance with villagers, based on communal
orders alternative to exogenous capital and corporate interests.
Finally, the monastery’s objection focused on the land before the entrance hall of the
temple (where the guardian deity Skanda was worshipped), which the state planned to
resume for the tourism complex. At the time of the project, the space was home to a
small square, controlled by the monastery and named Di Tan (the Earthly Altar, in
contrast to Tian Tan, the Heavenly Altar). The monastery argued that an open space
before the Skanda hall had a ritualistic and symbolic function and was integral to any
temple following the Chinese Mahayana Buddhism (Ming Pao, 26 August 2002). While
the land was in reality unleased government land, and the monastery acknowledged it, the
monks invoked an alternative concept of property rights, based on the actual use and
appropriation of land (see. Blomley, 2003).
However, like any group, the ability of the monastery to harness media discourses to
speciﬁc discursive formulations has its limits. Even when the conﬂict was evolving in 2002,
some media commentaries speculated that there was more to the monastery’s agenda than
resisting secularist interventions. As the subsequent expansion of the monastery gradually
unveiled, the media, in retrospect, viewed the 2002 event in new light – sympathetic
comments ebbed to an extent, while neutral, analytical and even overtly critical tones
were on the rise. Our interviews with senior monks also give credence to a more complex,
entangled picture of interactions between faith actors and the state. By no means are we
arguing that the rhetorics of identity, ritualistic meaning, sacredness and grassroots alliance
are simply manufactured to conceal a clandestine agenda. Our point is that although these
issues, focusing on transcendent values and meanings, may be ﬁrmly anchored in the monks’
subjectivity, faith actors also have multiple layers of aspirations and sensibilities (Asad,
2003).
First, during the interviews, the monks suggested that the ritualistic meanings of land
were actually secondary to its exchange value. On the one hand, as Monk W remarks, in
Hong Kong, whose urbanism is deﬁned by severe scarcity of land, high cost for land leasing
and massive land speculation, ‘everyone is intuitively sensitive to land and not willing to
surrender even a square inch’ (September 2016). On the other hand, because land within the
premise of the monastery had been reserved for the Ten Thousand Buddha Hall project, the
monks were keen to keep control of the land in question for potential additional project of
monastery expansion.
Second, media commentaries speculated, and our interviews conﬁrmed, that Po-Lin
monastery opposed the NP360 largely out of the worry that the latter would channel
away visitors’ spending, attenuate the monastery’s revenue and jeopardise ﬁnancial
viability of projects such as the grand hall. Given that the selling of vegetarian meals was
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back then the primary source of income for the monastery, the opposition was
underpinned by a practical economic rationality.
Finally, our interviews with local villagers suggested that socio-cultural ties between the
monastery and the village have never been as strong as the monastery claimed. Of the six
native households catering to visitors, we managed to interview four. Among them, all but
one express suspicion towards the monastery’s rhetoric of seamless local unity. At the time
of the conﬂict, neither did local villagers uniformly oppose NP360, nor did they
intentionally avoid selling meat dishes. Some media reports also implied that an alliance
united around a common Buddhist legacy was probably nothing more than a myth
concocted by the monastery. The monastery, in fact, was long in conﬂictual relationship
with Brook Bernacci, a colonial lawyer and politician, and his descendants. The latter
owned a plot of land in Ngong Ping and wanted to develop it into a hotel, but from
time to time the plan was aborted due to persistent opposition of the monastery (Ming
Pao, 20 December 2002).
All that said, media commentaries generally concurred that during the conﬂict, the
monastery artfully mobilised public media to their favour – ‘Sik Chi Wai . . . knows about
the media: you are not interested in moderate expressions, you are after emotional, colourful
quotes. So he did his best to please’ (South China Morning Post, 27 October 2002). Amidst a
discursive space where sympathetic voices were overwhelming, the monastery struck a ﬁnal
blow to the government, announcing, on 22 October 2002, that they would close the
monastery and Tian Tan Buddha for a week, to register their strong concerns. To avoid a
further deterioration of the situation, Michael Suen, then Secretary for Housing, Planning
and Lands, took a helicopter ride to Po-Lin Monastery and had a meeting with senior
monks and local district councillors. The major concession that Suen made, along with
minor ones, was to modify the spatial layout of the tourism complex so that the
monastery would continue to control the land before the Skanda Hall. Immediately after
the meeting, the monastery released to the press that they had decided to support the NP360
project.
Ten Thousand Buddha Hall: The vortex of religious entrepreneurialism
If the state, as we suggested earlier, was reluctant to lose an ally in civil society, the
monastery also avoided turning its relationship with the state into one of animosity. In
fact, to stand with the state in the NP360 project helped the monastery to build the image
of a committed and dependable friend willing to sacriﬁce some interests to advance state
agendas. This, eventually, gave the monastery extra stake in bargaining with the state
regarding ensuing projects of monastery expansion. In the aftermath of 2002, the
monastery continued to manoeuvre state–religion relations to push forward the Ten
Thousand Buddha Hall project. The state, recognising the monastery as a relatively
cooperative element in society, is willing to give the latter preferential treatment in
tourism development in Ngong Ping. For example, in 2010, the government spent 77
million HKD out of taxpayers’ money to rebuild the Ngong Ping Square, in an attempt
to improve the local built environment. The government intentionally furnished the square
with Buddhist iconographies and statues of Buddhist deities, showing that the state held in
high regard local Buddhist legacies. Besides, during the construction of the hall, the
monastery demolished its King Yin Lei Mansion, a renowned old stone structure. This
invited widespread criticism and suspicion about whether the monastery really cared
about cultural legacies, as they claimed in 2002 (South China Morning Post, 24 September
2007). However, the government chose to remain reticent throughout the debate.
Qian and Kong 171
A central issue illustrating the monastery’s exploitation of the state–religion rapport
concerned the premium charged by the Land Department of Hong Kong in regard to the
hall project. Given that Hong Kong Government is the de jure owner of land in the city, any
change of land use is subject to the payment of a premium. Because the building of a
splendidly furnished hall was already costly, the monastery made it a priority to bargain
for maximal discount in land premium. During our interview, staﬀ at Ngong Ping 360
Limited insists that, because they have built up the market of tourism in Ngong Ping, the
absolute number of people spending in the monastery has increased. This view seems to be
corroborated by ﬁeld observations and interviews. Yet, since 2002, the monastery, in media,
largely performed the role of a religious institution victimised by NP360. On several
occasions, Master Chi Wai lamented that NP360 contributed to an increase of the
monastery’s expenditure (for hiring more employees to tackle increased tourists) but
decrease of spending in the monastery (Sing Tao Daily, 13 June 2006; Sing Tao Daily, 11
May 2008). He even called himself a ‘sinner’ in the history of the monastery, for Tian Tan
Buddha, which he advocated, was the root cause of state-led development in Ngong Ping
(Ming Pao, 13 June 2007).
Positioned as a victim, the monastery claimed that a discounted premium was a totally
legitimate compensation for their sacriﬁce to public interests. This claim proved rhetorically
powerful. While the Land Department initially set the premium at close to 50 million HKD,
it was reduced to 15 million in January 2006 and ﬁnally to 12 million in September. Some
media reports also disclosed that the Chinese central government, via its liaison oﬃce in
Hong Kong, intervened in the bargain in favour of the monastery, but whether this
intervention played a decisive role has not yet been validated.
In October 2014, the Ten Thousand Buddha Hall was opened with a consecration ritual.
CY Leung, Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and Zhang Xiaoming, Director of the Liaison
Oﬃce of the Chinese Central Government, both attended the ritual, further obscuring the
line between secular politics and religiosity. The hall vastly enlarges the horizon of religious
experience in the monastery. In a sense, it presents a prima facie example of spirituality
mediated by spectacles, iconographies and materialities (Engelke, 2010; Goh, 2008). In
addition to its grandiose architectural form (a ﬁve-storey Chinese-style hall and 120
dragon-carved stone pillars), the hall has a lavishly furnished interior, with 10,000 small
gilded statues of Buddha lined in a capacious hall, and ﬁve large gilded statues, each of
which is placed at the centre of a storey, worth 6.88 million HKD, and donated by Buddhist
believers. The hall is also home to a wide array of Buddhist relics and arts, of which the
premium collectibles include a complete set of the Chinese Buddhist Canon (Chinese:
dazangjing ), compiled and printed by the Qing imperial court, and a rich collection
of Tibetan Buddhist thangka. The ﬁve storeys serve the diverse functions of assembly,
lecturing, meditation and ordination. The current operation of the hall betrays the notion
of religious experiences as commodities to be consumed via economic capital, for only
believers who have generously donated to the monastery can access and use Storeys 2 to 5.
Conclusion
In this article, we began our argument by contesting the notion of modernity as an epoch in
which the secular–religious diﬀerentiation is entrenched. While geographers of religion
recognise that there is a dialectic between the secular and the religious, this article pushes
this line of theorisation one step further, by arguing that both the religious and the secular
are in fact hybrid constructs that are simultaneously sacred and profane, transcendent and
immanent. Although there has been much progress in the geographies of religion to
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demonstrate that the secular realm is not so much secularised as an ideal type would suggest,
relatively less work has been dedicated to problematise and re-conceptualise religiosity.
Ultimately, this article has attempted to establish the view that, if religion is by no means
‘sequestrated’ by the secular, it has also been re-invented by the latter (Davie, 2007; Hervieu-
Le´ger, 1986). In this sense, the notion of religion as a constitutive outside of secular
modernity, a system of thought and action deﬁned foremost by its transcendence over
secularity, must be put under critical scrutiny.
Po-Lin Monastery provides a useful case for generating insights into religious institutions
relativising the conception of religiosity and engaging with the animus of modernity. We
summarise some key points, which bolster our argument that the dichotomies of the secular
and the religious, the sacred and the profane collapse within the institutional behaviours,
organisational cultures and modus operandi of faith actors. First, the monastery has
selectively imbibed entrepreneurial and market culture of modernity, emphasising
perpetual creation of new religious experiences as extravaganza and marketable goods.
Second, in the cosmopolitan urban environment of Hong Kong, where spirituality has
largely been individualised, and religion no longer plays a central role in institutionalised
social orders (Bruce, 2010). It appears that religious leaders in Po-Lin monastery do not have
to be role models in a moral and ethical sense, but instead emphasise their role as diligent
agents whose work is to ‘manage’ and promote religiosity. In Hong Kong media, it is not
unusual to encounter parodying, even sarcastic portrayals of Master Chi Wai and other
Buddhist leaders. Yet, it is also true that people depend heavily on these ﬁgures for the
supply of spiritual goods. Finally, another contextual condition that warrants underlining
here is that Hong Kong is a society with a ﬁrmly established tradition for religion to actively
partake in secular politics. Indeed, as Councillor Yu from the Islands District Council
remarks, ‘religious matters always have the advantage, if not on the top’ (September
2016). Hence, no wonder that media accounts commented, in either complimentary or
sarcastic tones, that the monks knew the ‘art’ and rules of dealing with the state.
In sum, this article has ventured to extend extant theorisations about the relationship
between secularity and religiosity in modernity. We do not argue for the dismantling of the
categories of ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ nor do we dismiss the secularisation paradigm. Instead,
we accept the categories as ideal types, from which adaptations, modiﬁcations, and
hybridisations emerge. Precisely because forces of secularisation impact on religious
orders, religion, over the course of negotiating these forces, has learnt from the latter and
been ‘secularised’ in some ways through adopting immanent values and practices. As much
as Tse (2014) has argued that secularism is a form of (grounded) theology in that those who
call themselves ‘secular’ may be guided by implicit theological narratives in their practices,
we promulgate the view that those who call themselves religious also employ secular ways to
promote their religions and achieve the survival and growth of religious congregations and
activities.
To conclude this article, we hope that the current study may encourage future work in at
least two directions. First, within the context of the current case and comparable cases of
entrepreneurial religions, to attend to the religious experiences of ordinary believers, beyond
the examination of religious leaders, may help extend the analytical framework and further
nuance an epistemology of religiosity. Second, the notion of religious actors involved in
market behaviours and enterprising creates a productive tension with the recent thesis of
postsecular rapprochement (Cloke and Beaumont, 2012). In this latter scholarship, activities
undertaken by FBOs and actors are usually analysed as an important force restoring social
justice amidst neoliberal retrenchment of state functions and welfare. The current study,
however, implies that entrepreneurial religions have more complex relationships with social
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justice in highly marketised societies. Po-Lin Monastery, on the one hand, is active in all
sorts of charity and service provision; the expansion of the monastery also creates jobs and
economic opportunities for the local community, isolated from Hong Kong proper in many
ways. On the other hand, however, the monastery is heavily involved in land and property
speculation, contributing – to an extent that this research is not able to estimate with
conﬁdence – to the inﬂation of property market and worsening of housing aﬀordability in
Hong Kong (although its expansion has not yet encroached the adjacent village). In sum, if
entrepreneurial religion is an uneasy hybridity of pro- and counter-market impulses, its
relations to social justice might be necessarily indeterminate, to be examined in speciﬁc
contexts of uneven empirical realities.
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